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CHAPTER 8
 INTRODUCTION: POP NATIONALISM, YOUTH, 
AND J-CULTURE MEDIA MIX
Following the publication of revisionist manga series such as Sensōron 
(On War, 1998–2003, 3 vols.) by Yoshinori Kobayashi, Japanese comics 
and popular cultures have attracted increasing attention within the heated 
public debate surrounding issues of history, national identity, and youth 
(Sakamoto 2008). Public discussion on historical revisionism and school 
textbooks has been so far to a large amount shaped by political or ideo-
logical interpretations about the past, present, and future of the nation. 
However, some commentators have pinpointed the emergence of radical 
changes within new generations in Japan in regard to their self-perception 
and identity, and to their relationship with the nation as an imagined com-
munity, noting the emergence of a post-ideological or post-modern sen-
sibility, increasingly indifferent to modernist, content-based, true versus 
false or good versus evil dialectics, which continues to inform the evalua-
tive horizon of both conservative and progressive institutional discourses 
(Honda 2007).
Within such context, this chapter examines the specific transformation 
over the past two decades that has contributed to elevate J-culture, the 
transmedial constellation of manga, anime, video games, character design, 
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youth subcultures, and so forth, to an emergent arena for re-defining 
Japan and its post-imagined communities. Put differently, since the 1990s, 
popular cultures have become the strategic site where renegotiation of 
the significance attributed to the past, present, and future of the nation 
as well as its socialization are articulated through the fluid intersection of 
hegemonic trajectories from “above” and “below,” both of which are dis-
seminated across the proliferating circuits of the Japanese “media mix”:
The “media mix” is a term that refers to the media environment whereby 
a particular franchise releases interconnecting products for a wide range of 
media “platforms”—animation, comics, video games, theatrical films, sound-
tracks—and commodity types—cell-phone straps, T-shirts, bags, figurines, 
and so on. It is a state of what we might call the “serial inter- connection of 
commodities”—wherein commodities (including media types) do not stand 
alone as products but interrelate, generally through the existence of a prin-
cipal character or narrative.
(Steinberg 2009: 191)
Based on a fieldwork conducted on the multimedia platform originated 
by the webmanga Axis Powers Hetalia (2006–) and its fandom, where 
nations and world history are personified as cute boys, in this chapter 
I explore the complex mobilization of emotions, pleasures, and desires 
reconfiguring relations between history, nation, and youth. Particular 
attention will be given to emergent hegemonic articulations from “below” 
stimulating so-called moe affect: an ambiguous neologism difficult to 
define, but which under the sign of light-hearted parody, polymorphous 
pleasure, and cross-gendered sexuality has become in the last decade a 
dominant paradigm among more or less subcultural young prosumers, 
both male-oriented otaku (fans of manga, anime, video games, etc.) and 
female-oriented fujoshi (litt. “rotten women, girls”; fans of male-to-male 
homosexual fantasies).
 POP NATIONALISM “FROM ABOVE”: COOL JAPAN
Institutionalized pop nationalism is strongly shaped by recent govern-
mental policies aimed at promoting cultural or creative industries under 
the umbrella term of “Cool Japan”: a slogan influenced by the concept 
of “Japan’s Gross National Cool,” as first formulated in an article pub-
lished on Foreign Policy in 2002. The author, Douglas McGray, suggested 
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that the post-bubble 1990s decade of economic stagnation had not been 
completely negative for Japan, because during the very same period the 
nation had arisen to global cultural superpower status thanks to the global 
spread of its popular culture products, which came to dominate consump-
tion, tastes, and trends of younger generations across the world. More 
importantly, McGray argued that this international success offered enor-
mous potential that was still to be explored and implemented in terms 
of economical and geopolitical opportunities, especially in relation to the 
nation’s “soft power” policies. A term coined by political scientist Joseph 
Nye, soft power refers to a kind of power that, unlike hard power, does not 
rely on coercive methods in the realm of politics, military might, and eco-
nomic incentives and sanctions, relies instead on the increasing strategic 
importance of nation-states to influence and control other nation-states 
through persuasion and consent, thanks to their own ideology, values, and 
culture (Nye 2004).
The concept of “Cool Japan” was subsequently adopted enthusiasti-
cally by politicians and bureaucrats as a panacea against post-bubble stag-
nation, becoming a national strategy of the new millennium, both as an 
economical–industrial programme to increase profit on the international 
market, and as a politico-diplomatic programme to improve Japan’s image 
in the world. The annual reports of the Program for the Promotion of 
Intellectual Property (chiteki zaisan suishin keikaku), that began to be 
published in 2003 under the Koizumi government, and even more so the 
following reports issued by the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI), advocated a new national policy promoting cultural 
and intellectual production, instead of the previous manufacturing sec-
tor (cars and electronic consumption goods). Moreover, the reports sug-
gested that these cultural and intellectual goods should be invested with 
“Japaneseness” and contribute to a strategy of nation branding, relying on 
national symbolism in order to create added value. In 2010, this strategy 
was further implemented through the foundation of a specific Cool Japan 
Office within METI, aimed at coordinating all other ministries, cultural 
industry, and emergent creative professions, towards the production of 
nation branding tactics (METI 2010).
Following the establishment of the “Cool Japan” institutional strat-
egy, manga, anime, and youth cultures were elevated to the status of 
new official face of Japan. This was also the result of the joined mobiliza-
tion of a number of national agencies and ministries, from the Japanese 
National Organization of Tourism (JNTO), advertising for foreign visitors 
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“Pilgrimages to Sacred Sites” that were featured in manga, anime, video 
games, or television dramas (JETRO 2005, 2015), from the national tele-
vision channel NHK broadcasting since 2006 more than 100 episodes 
of the series “Cool Japan. Hakkutsu kakkōii Nippon,” to the kind of pop 
diplomacy inaugurated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s nominating 
the atomic-powered cat character Doraemon as “Anime Ambassador of 
Japan” (2008) and three fashion trendsetting girl as “Ambassadors of 
kawaii (cute)” (2009) to be paraded in Japanese diplomatic and cultural 
institutions across the world (Daliot-Bul 2009; Iwabuchi 2008).
Regardless of the effectiveness offered by this kind of nation branding 
in terms of increased international competitiveness for the cultural indus-
try or of increased soft power for the state, what is of particular interest 
for the purposes of this chapter is the fact that a strategic alliance is taking 
place under the slogan of “Cool Japan” between neo-conservative and 
neo-liberal forces. This has contributed in the last decade to a nationwide 
rhetoric on popular and youth cultures, mobilizing politics, bureaucracy, 
industry, and mass media, in order to improve the nation’s image on the 
international arena, to revitalize a stagnating economy and to find again 
pride in its own culture.
 POP NATIONALISM “FROM BELOW”: J-CULTURE 
AND YOUTH PANIC
While “Cool Japan” is a concept mainly deployed in institutional discourse, 
I describe as “pop nationalism from below” the cultural strategies more 
directly related to the younger generations and how they experience the 
nation. I use the concept to reflect on how Japan as an “imagined com-
munity” is being re-produced among those who have been acculturated 
and socialized within the transmedial constellation of J-culture. Whereas 
Cool Japan is an institutional response to the post-ideological instability 
and traumatic economic slowdown induced by the end of the Cold War 
and the post-bubble stagnation, pop nationalism from below stems from 
internal changes, in particular in the sociocultural spheres.
On the one hand, we see the crisis of the “Japan, Inc.” model 
(kigyōshakai) nurtured by the rapid post-war economic growth and 
prosperity, and the consequent decline of the idea of a corporate nation, 
symbolized by the social icons of the “white collar worker” (sararīman) 
and the “full-time housewife” (sengyōshufu), working in concert to form 
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the basis of the collective myth of “one hundred million middle class” 
(ichioku sōchūryū) of a homogenous nation. On the other hand, we see the 
intensification of neo-liberal capitalism shaped by information  technology, 
advanced consumerism, and ludic entertainment, where the increasing 
impoverishment of the middle classes and precarization of the labour 
market have introduced the idea of an “unequal society” (kakusa shakai) 
(Yoda and Harootunian 2006).
Within this scenario, the new generations who appear no longer willing 
to contribute actively to the social reproduction anchored on the modern 
paradigms of study, work, and family, have become the centre of public 
preoccupation and alarmed discussions. The sources of this public con-
cern range from young people who avoid social interaction and seclude 
themselves in their private rooms (hikikomori) to students refusing to go 
to school (futōkō), young adults, particularly women, who postpone mar-
riage and continue to live in their parents’ home (parasite single); mascu-
linizing “carnivore women” who are assertively independent, dedicated to 
work, and reject marriage and motherhood; feminized “herbivore men” 
who are passive, don’t invest on their career, and don’t seek a partner 
to marry; “free young workers” who seem to prefer self-realization to 
stable employment (freeter); and young people who are “not in education, 
employment, or training” (NEET), to name but the most significant.
Japanese mass media have fabricated in the last two decades an endless 
list of such negative stereotypes, contributing to the social construction 
of the alarming, disturbing, or simply weird nature of Japanese youth, 
which was subsequently amplified by international journalism and schol-
arship. However, it can be argued that this public rhetoric, rather than 
documenting a concrete shift towards asociality of the new generations, 
represents instead a kind of social panic; it reveals the growing anxiety of 
adult society about its future, which is further enhanced by their reliance 
on obsolete categories in order to make sense of these ongoing transfor-
mations (Goodman et al. 2012).
It is in this wider context that the more specific intersection between 
national identity, youth, and history is being negotiated and reconfigured. 
On the institutional side, neo-conservative forces are intensifying their 
efforts towards a more nationalistic and patriotic turn, including proposals 
for revision of article 9, the “peace article” of the Japanese Constitution, 
participation of the so-called “Self Defence forces” in international peace- 
keeping missions, visits to the Yasukuni shrine by prime ministers and diet 
cabinet members to commemorate Second World War soldiers, including 
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A-class war criminals, and new moral and patriotic guidelines for public 
education, such as the formal recognition in 1999 of the national anthem 
Kimi ga yo and the Hi no Maru national flag to be celebrated in public 
schools, or the adoption of “patriotic” textbooks such as Kokoro no nōto 
(Notes for the Heart) for primary and junior high school students pro-
moted by the Ministry of Education (MEXT) in 2002 (Rose 2006).
In addition, revisionist or negationist discourses on the nation’s mod-
ern history have intensified, especially in order to revise collective percep-
tions of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial forces following 
the invasion or occupation of neighbouring Asian countries during the 
Pacific War. Among the most influential is the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reforms (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukuru kai) that was able 
to obtain ministerial approval for its revisionist school textbook in 2002, 
while more openly xenophobic statements, especially anti-Chinese and 
anti-Korean ones, have become pervasive through online dissemination 
on less institutional message boards, like “2channel” or on right-wing 
websites (netto uyoku), such as “Sakura Channel” (Children and Textbook 
Japan Network 21 2013).
It comes as no surprise that within these right-wing efforts, national 
and international public opinion have become particularly sensitive to the 
growing historical revisionism and negationism, and especially to popu-
lar publications such as manga targeting younger audiences. Yoshinori 
Kobayashi is the author of the manga series Gōmanism Sengen (9 vols., 
1995–), including Sensōron (On War, 3 vols., 1998–2003), that ostensibly 
aims at correcting the “distorted and masochistic vision” of Japanese mod-
ern history that Kobayashi argues was fabricated by the US Occupation 
Forces and Japanese leftists. According to Kobayashi, current historiogra-
phy is a kind of brainwashing that has been imposed upon the Japanese 
people by the US-sponsored individualistic values of anti-militaristic paci-
fism, human rights, equality, and feminism, becoming the main obstacle 
for the development of patriotism and a healthy nationalism in post-war 
Japan. His mangaesque revisionism relies on a selected historic documen-
tation, and advocates, among other things, denial of the “fabricated” his-
toriography on the Nanking Massacre or of the forced sexual exploitation 
of “comfort women”; to contrast this, he urges to re-discover the heroic 
self-sacrifice of kamikaze and other soldiers condemned by the Tokyo War 
Crimes Tribunal, such as general Hideki Tōjō, who all fought inspired by 
their love for their families, nation, and emperor in order to free Asia from 
racist “white” colonialism.
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Even more controversial has been the publication of the series Manga 
Kenkanryū (Hate the Korean Wave, 4 vols., 2005–2009) and Manga 
Kenchūgokuryū (Hate the Chinese Wave, 2008) by Yamano Sharin, that 
displays an explicit anti-Korean and anti-Chinese rhetoric. This xenopho-
bic discourse strongly resonates with growing online hate-speech against 
Asian foreigners or Zainichi Koreans (ethnic Korean permanent residents 
in Japan), resulting in anti-immigrant groups rallying in the streets, such 
as the case of the Zaitokukai (Association of Citizens against the Special 
Privileges of the Zainichi). Yamano’s first manga series can be seen as a 
reaction to the “Korean Wave” (the rise in popularity of South Korean 
TV fiction and pop music) and to Japan–Korea disputes (Japan–Korea 
Annexation Treaty, Liancourt Rocks, comfort women, etc.), while the sec-
ond manga addresses Japan–China disputes (anti-Japanese nationalism in 
China, the Nanking Massacre, Chinese food safety, etc.) (Liscutin 2009). 
Similar to Kobayashi’s Gomanism series, Yamano’s manga employs a first 
person narrative to explain to its young audience the “real” historical and 
political truth of the nation’s relationship with Korea and China by resort-
ing to the same revisionist historiography.
Both authors had close relations with the Japanese Society for History 
Textbook Reforms, Kobayashi even being a founding member in 1996, 
while Yamano’s manga include revisionist essays of its academic affiliates. 
Both employ the manga in an instrumental way in order to popularize 
an ideological discourse with assertive and clear revisionist messages, by 
resorting to some extent to argumentative demonstration. However hard 
they try to employ the expressive, symbolic, and affective potentiality of 
the manga as medium, they do not exceed in a significant way other insti-
tutionalized political and historical commentary that is still confined by 
the communicative restraints of modernist, serious, and contents-based 
nationalism.
Both series represent the most successful examples of revisionist manga, 
as demonstrated by their good sales: 600,000 copies for Kobayashi’s first 
volume of the Sensōron trilogy and 450,000 copies for Yamano’s first vol-
ume of Manga Kenkanryū. However, two considerations should be made 
on those numbers. Firstly, while these sales are high in absolute terms, we 
must remember that manga bestseller status is usually measured in terms 
of millions of copies sold for a single volume, and of tenths or even hun-
dreds of millions for a whole series; compared to those figures, neither 
manga series has been as outstanding a success as media coverage seemed 
to imply. Secondly, we must remember that the manga have necessarily 
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been purchased exclusively not only by supporters of historical revision-
ism but also by a large number of students, teachers, intellectuals, and 
journalists, who were curious or alarmed by its controversial contents. In 
other words, although the texts do represent the ideological perspectives 
of its authors and have therefore spurred alarmism in public opinion, 
the real effectiveness of this kind of mangaesque effort in popularizing 
historical revisionism among a wider range of the younger audience is 
questionable.
 YOUTH PATRIOTISM AND NATIONALISM
In this battle to conquer the hearts and minds of the younger genera-
tions, are Japanese youth really becoming more patriotic or nationalistic? 
If we pay attention to empirical findings offered by national surveys in 
the past two decades, a rather ambivalent picture emerges. According to 
these reports, from a cross-generational point of view, the average “strong 
love for the nation” appears to have remained relatively stable, decreas-
ing from 52.8 % in 1995 to 51.5 % in 2005, with a low of 48.4 % in 2000, 
and increasing again from 51.5 % in 2010 to 55.4 % in 2015.1 Very similar 
findings are offered by Dentsu’s national surveys, Japan’s biggest PR and 
advertisement company: a decrease in the number of interviewees answer-
ing that they are “proud of being Japanese” from 60.1 % in 1995 to 57.4 % 
in 2005, and a new increase to 65.4 % in 2010. More importantly, even the 
supposedly higher rate of patriotism of more recent years is still very low 
when compared to similar surveys on an international scale. According to 
the World Values Survey 2010 and the European Values Study 2014  in 
2010, 71.5 % of Japanese prided themselves in their own nation, one of 
the lowest results in the whole world, more precisely 56th out of 58 coun-
tries surveyed, far behind the US score of 91.4 %, UK score of 91.1 %, or 
South Korea’s 90.8 % and China’s 89.6 %.2
Most importantly, besides the slight cross-generational changes and 
comparatively low level of attachment to one’s nation, clearly constant 
is the gap in patriotic sentiment between older and younger generations. 
In 2015, the 55.4 % statement of “strong love for the nation” drew an 
approval rate of 69.6 % rate among the population aged 70 and above, but 
only 42.3 % among respondents under 29.3 Similarly, in 2010, 65.4 % of 
respondents stating to be “proud of being Japanese” was averaged between 
74.3 % for respondents over 50 and 54.4 % for respondents under 29. In 
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other words, not only patriotism appears to be inversely proportional to 
youth, but pride or love for the nation among the younger generation 
is significantly below the national average.4 Finally, in order to complete 
the international perspective, it may be useful to compare survey results 
on “the willingness to fight for one’s own nation.” In this case, there is a 
slight increase in the decade 2000–2010, from 13.4% to 15.2 %; but the 
15.2 % of respondents willing to fight for their own nation placed Japan as 
the most pacifist among 78 countries surveyed, with even greater differ-
ences compared to China’s 74.2 % and South Korea’s 63 %, or the USA’s 
57.8 % and UK’s 55.4 % (World Values Survey 2014).5
It may be therefore useful to stress that the increased media visibility of 
neo-conservative initiatives by the government and of revisionist or xeno-
phobic manga, movies, blogs, and so forth has not resulted, at least in the 
past two decades, into a significant increase of patriotism or nationalism 
among the wider population and, in particular, among the younger gener-
ations. To be more specific, if there has been an increase in patriotic pride 
or broader love for the Japanese nation, this process is not measurable and 
recognizable through the conventional ideological or political paradigms 
that have been employed to make sense of the modern “imagined com-
munity” of post-war Japan. On the contrary, I argue that most right-wing 
discourses and practices in contemporary Japan are best interpreted as a 
defensive reaction in the face of the younger generations who appear to 
be indifferent or reluctant to identify with a nation-state that offers them 
much less than what it gave their parents or grandparents. In this perspec-
tive, I see institutionalized nationalism and revisionist popular culture as 
associated with what has been defined as “therapeutic nationalism” (iyashi 
no nashonarizumu) or “anxious nationalism” (fuangata nashonarizumu), 
and as an expression of compensatory and defensive efforts in regard to 
the increasing uncertainty induced by neo-liberal capitalism, global com-
petition, in particular with China and South Korea, flexibility or instabil-
ity of the domestic labour market, and the transformation of Japan into 
a more fluid, consumerist, and ludic society (Oguma and Ueno 2003; 
Takahara 2006).
Psychiatrist Kayama Rika, one of the most important voices in the 
recent academic debate about Japanese youth nationalism, described it 
as a “petit nationalism” (puchi nashonarizumu) or “naïve nationalism” 
(mujakina nashonarizumu), to distinguish it from the more ostensibly 
ideological forms of the past. Phenomena like the renewed craze for the 
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national football team, the passionate participation in singing Kimi ga yo, 
and the proliferation of subcultures interested in national history obvi-
ously express a rekindling of concern for something akin to the idea of 
nation, but in Kayama’s view such interest is rather dehistoricized and 
depoliticized. Others, like sociologist Takahara Motoaki, integrate this 
interpretation with the concept of “hobbyfied nationalism” (shumika shita 
nashonarizumu), which they see as produced by a society where more 
and more young people prefer to define themselves through new media, 
consumption, and especially their hobbies, rather than through traditional 
areas of socialization such as study, work, and family. Finally, cultural critic 
Kitada Akihiro called the phenomenon a “funny nationalism” (warau 
nashonarizumu), and saw its origin in a kind of “cynical romanticism” 
(shinikaruna romanshugi), which is born of two seemingly opposite social 
developments. On the one hand, cynical formalism, ironic detachment, 
and indifference towards the values and meta-narratives of modernity, 
which result in an obsession with formal aspects, and a lack of concern 
for depth, substance, and historical consciousness. On the other hand, an 
almost romantic emotional strain of intimacy, which leads to a search for 
close relationship and a need to share with others. The two are complicit 
in forming an image of the nation that is apparently formal and external-
ized, but at the same time becomes a simulacrum invested with a high 
level of affect, which can stimulate new relationships and social networks.
 NEW SENSITIVITIES “FROM BELOW”: MOE
Within the context of such increasingly publicized, hobbyfied, and ironic 
acculturation and socialization, great attention has been paid to a distinc-
tive form of emotional investment which appears to be shared by many 
emerging youth subcultures of the past decade. Moe is a neologism that is 
difficult to translate; the term itself refers to a strong passion, and is linked 
to the idea of germinating but also to that of caring for something or 
somebody. Its contemporary use arose in the 1990s within the subculture 
of male otaku (fans of video games, manga, anime, etc.), in the Akihabara 
electronics shops district of Tokyo. It indicates a spontaneous transport, or 
“burning passion,” for Japanese fictional characters that are young, pure, 
and sexy. The kyara, as these characters are called, are very kawaii (cute, 
adorable, innocent), but at the same time have clear sexual connotations. 
Some aspects of their recurring iconography are huge eyes without pupils, 
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soft contours and disproportionate heads, pale skin, cat ears, maid uni-
forms, sweet voices, and innocent personality.
These elements can be split, recomposed, and multiplied in the trans-
media galaxy of manga, anime, video games, and toys, to reconfigure new 
kyara characters that exist independently of any narrative or individual per-
sonality. Narrative and personality, however, are essential features for the 
more conventional fictional characters, which therefore end up function-
ing as hypotexts for the kyara: they are reduced to a repertoire from which 
to plunder to create parodies and unusual combinations (for a detailed dis-
cussion of the shift from character to kyara in post-1990s manga, see Itō 
2005). The creation of kyara is therefore a form of bricolage that draws 
on a database made up of diverse and dynamic code elements. Similar to 
online browsing, kyara culture does not require a modern grand narrative, 
paradigm, or unified perspective to guide the choices, readings, and inter-
pretations of its production–consumption in a cohesive fashion. Azuma 
Hiroki, the most influential theorist of otaku moe, has gone so far as to 
argue that this kind of “database consumption” is the key existential and 
epistemological feature of post-modern Japan (Azuma 2009).
This type of rhizomatous logic, which is reminiscent of the “cynical for-
malism” examined by Kitada, is supported by a “romantic” affect which 
is as intense as it is ambiguous. Moe in its original meaning within male 
otaku subcultures can be read as a combination of the rorikon (Lolita com-
plex) and bishōjo (beautiful girls) tropes, but is made more complex by the 
ambivalent overlap of infantilized innocence and adult desire (Galbraith 
2009). It builds on the stimulation of polymorphic-idealized feelings of 
protectiveness towards cute characters, presented as infantilized and help-
less, combined with attraction towards eroticized girls.
As it became more widespread, however, moe was also appropriated by 
women, especially by another emerging subculture known as fujoshi (liter-
ally “rotten girls”). This is a self-deprecating term in use among teenagers 
and young women who read and write Boys Love manga and anime (sto-
ries about erotic and romantic relationships between male gay men), and 
in particular a subgenre called yaoi, an acronym for “no climax, no end, no 
meaning” (yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi) which includes adaptations 
and parodies of original mainstream works, often without plot and sexu-
ally explicit, bordering on pornography. These adaptations are produced 
and consumed by the millions of prosumers, mostly women, who make 
up the wide world of dōjinshi, the circuit of amateur manga, novels, and 
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video games. The moe within fujoshi subculture, as in the case of otaku, 
feeds on a stimulation of polymorphic-idealized protective feelings for 
cute and defenceless characters, and attraction for eroticized boys. In this 
case, it is a combination of the subgenre of shotakon (Shōtarō complex) 
and bishōnen (beautiful boys). An important difference from the hetero-
sexual model of male otaku attraction for cute kyara is that girls’ moe is 
directed towards imaginary homosexual males.
Thanks to its spread within online discussions, fanfiction, and ama-
teur manga, moe has undergone further transformations in the past two 
decades, and can now be directed towards any inanimate object or abstract 
concept: operating systems, speech software, war machines, train lines, 
food, philosophical concepts, the Constitution, and so forth. Anything 
existing or imaginable has been anthropomorphized as shōjo and shōnen, 
girl and boy kyara that are both cutified and eroticized.
History and nation-states have not escaped this moefication of every-
thing, and the 2000s saw the birth of a phenomenon known as moe 
anthropomorphism of nations (moe kuni gijinka).
 AXIS POWERS HETALIA: SEXY NATIONS AND NATIONS 
WHO LOVE
The multimedia platform Axis Powers Hetalia (2006–present) is by far the 
most representative example of moe personification of nations and history, 
both for its success on the national and global market, and because it is the 
product of a strategic intersection between male otaku and female fujoshi 
subcultures. Hetalia was born in 2006 as a web manga, an amateur online 
comic in the surreal humour genre published by Himaruya Hidekaz 
(1985–) on his website Kitayume. It was then published in six print vol-
umes by Gentosha Comics (2008–2013) with a total circulation of over 
two million copies, and finally transposed into online TV animation and 
film by Studio Deen. As with any work of manga or anime that reaches a 
certain level of popularity, Hetalia has given rise to its own specific media 
mix, which has been multiplied and disseminated through a constellation 
of different media and merchandising: CDs of the anime soundtracks 
for individual characters (“character songs”), CDs of audio adaptations 
(“drama CD”), video games, dedicated purikura camera booths, vending 
machines with Hetalia soft drinks, model toys, and of course hundreds of 
stationery items.
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The term Hetalia of the title is a combination of the slang neologism 
hetare (inept, pathetic wimp) and Itaria (Italy), and could be roughly 
translated as “Loser Italy.” The web manga contains a long series of very 
brief vignettes that describe the international relations between the three 
countries of the Axis Powers (Italy, Germany, and Japan) and the Allied 
countries (USA, Britain, France, Russia, China). Over the years, more 
than forty nations have become personified, almost entirely as a shōnen, 
pretty but incompetent boys. The setting is that of the First and Second 
World Wars, but also includes episodes of ancient history and some con-
temporary geopolitical events.
Of particular interest with regards to moe is the polymorphous con-
figuration of the main characters. Italy is usually personified as a shōnen 
boy type, but also appears as a more adult and virile version (grandfa-
ther Roman Empire) and a chibi Italy version (premodern Italia), a femi-
nized mini-Italy that is threatened by the attentions of the physically more 
aggressive and masculine chibi Austria (premodern Austria).
Hetalia is a highly successful intersection between the worlds of otaku 
and fujoshi, something that is particularly unusual in Japan given the 
clear gender segregation of the cultural industry and youth subcultures. 
The male author, Himaruya, explained that the creation of the work was 
inspired by otaku online discussions on the web forum 2channel that 
revolved around weapons, armies, and nations, from which it emerged 
that Italy was always the weakest, and therefore the natural “Loser.” 
However, he chose to personify the nations not in the form of cute eroti-
cized girls, as one could expect in the male otaku context, but rather as 
pretty boys. Interestingly, his success was determined by female online 
fandom, especially after the appropriation, imitation, and adaptation in the 
field of dōjinshi, the vast sea of amateur Japanese manga, which ultimately 
supports the whole Japanese cultural industry.
In the world of female dōjinshi, especially among teenagers and young 
women, Hetalia emerged between 2009 and 2011 as the most adapted 
and parodied work, with almost 10,000 different titles, distributed 
through amateur circuits and at large exhibitions devoted entirely to it 
(“Hetalia Only Events”), in bookstores in Akihabara and in Ikebukuro’s 
Otome Road to (the centre of fujoshi subcultures) and through count-
less message boards on the internet.6 The net was also the vehicle of the 
manga’s extraordinary popularity overseas, thanks to the work of amateur 
scanlation (online translation of manga) and fansubbing (amateur subti-
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tling of anime) by non-Japanese fans, which were circulated even before 
the official translations. Finally, the official English translations, published 
at the end of 2010, made the first two volumes of Hetalia the bestselling 
manga on the North American market.
This success may seem surprising considering that Hetalia was from the 
beginning an amateur work, with no narrative complexity or aesthetic and 
graphic sophistication. Much of its appeal is based on a combination of 
comedy and male personification of nations, whose relations are mediated 
by primordial impulses of attraction and repulsion, with admittedly hilari-
ous effects, and deployed in brief episodes inspired by real events in world 
history. The Japanese readers of the original manga listed the following 
key terms as their main objects of interest, in order of preference: 1. Love, 
2. Nations, 3. Pleasure, 4. Moe, 5. Laughter.7
Within the context of dōjinshi, on the other hand, readers, authors, 
and event organizers mention two main reasons for their attraction to the 
comic. First, Hetalia and its shōnen characters extended the moe anthropo-
morphism of nations, so far confined to a male audience of otaku attracted 
by shōjo personifications, to a female audience. Second, compared to other 
original works adapted within dōjinshi, the stories and characters in Hetalia 
are not bound by narrative structure, environment, or psychological char-
acterization. This opens up endless possibilities for adaptation and parody. 
In other words, it stimulates a more intimate and affective imaginative 
approach to the readers’ favourite nations and pairings of characters.
 SEXUALIZING THE “WEST” × “JAPAN”
But what are the fantasies about nations that Hetalia helped spur within 
amateur dōjinshi? They are typically structured according to the code of 
sexualized fantasies of yaoi, a pivotal genre in fujoshi subcultures, which 
was only hinted at in the original version but becomes central in the adap-
tations. The main dynamic of romantic and sexual relationships in yaoi is 
declined according to the grammar of so-called seme and uke. While the 
seme (literally the one who penetrates or attacks) is the dominant charac-
ter and is characterized as active, stronger, and more masculine, the uke 
(literally the one who receives) is more submissive, passive, and feminine 
(Hori 2009).
The most parodied character is Japan (Nihon in the original, Honda 
Kiku in the parodies), portrayed as a shōnen but feminized as uke in a 
plethora of different forms, from the most childish, to versions that 
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are merely kawaii, to more sexualized ones, bordering on paedophilia, 
and more adult androgynous ones. The most popular seme partners he 
is paired with in dōjinshi fairs dedicated specifically to the character of 
Nihon are all Caucasians characters representing the “white” nations of 
Euro-America; in order of preference, England, the USA, France, Prussia, 
Italy, and Russia (StadioYou 2010a, p. 1). The most commonly recur-
ring pairings at other fairs are America (seme)/England (uke), England 
(seme)/Japan (uke), France (seme)/England (uke), and Germany (seme)/
Italy (uke) (StadioYou 2010b: 1, 8).
The imagined geography underlying these inter-national couplings in 
dōjinshi are already explicitly represented in the original Hetalia-printed 
manga volumes, including world maps based on Eurocentric cartography 
(Himaruya 2010: 10–11). Besides Japan, almost all the main characters in 
the original manga and anime versions are cute and attractive white male 
Caucasians: Axis Powers Italy and Germany, together with Allied forces 
USA, England, France, Russia, and the “Five Nordic Nations” (Norway, 
Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark). Most of the episodes are inspired 
by events that occurred between First and Second World Wars, and centre 
on intimate quarrels between European characters, the American char-
acter, and Japan. If we consider Japan’s international relations in this 
period, we find that most of the real historical and military events actually 
involved very dramatic and tragic contacts between Imperial Japan and its 
Asian neighbours. However, the series only includes a few Asian charac-
ters, of which the most important is China, with some independent epi-
sodes centring on the character of Korea in the web manga, while Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, and Vietnam appear mainly as sketch characters in 
Himaruya’s webpage and blog.
In addition to the textual and visual level, the modern cultural history 
of national identity as regards “Japan” versus the “West” is confirmed by 
readers’ preference for white Caucasian characters. A poll carried out by 
Hetalia publisher Gentōsha on readers’ most loved characters looks like a 
kind of gaijin akogare (fascination for western foreigners) ranking. In fact, 
the nineteen most popular characters after top-ranking Japan are England, 
Germany, Russia, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Greece, USA, Sweden, with 
China as the only character from the ‘Rest’ of the world voted in 17th 
place.8
This kind of mangaesque attraction for the “white male” is further 
confirmed by the dōjinshi amateur scene. Maps of Hetalia-only conven-
tions show how the distribution of tables and fan circles are structured 
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according to the BL or yaoi code of male-to-male seme/uke pairings. The 
most popular is the America (seme)/England (uke) pairing, followed by 
the England (seme)/Japan (uke) pairing, the Prussia (uke) corner, the 
France (seme)/England (uke) pairing, and the Scandinavian characters 
corner (StadioYou 2010b: 8). Japan is not only the most popular char-
acter among general readers of the original, but also very popular as a 
completely feminized or infantilized male uke character on the dōjinshi 
scene. Exhibition layouts of Hetalia conventions centred exclusively on 
Japan as a uke character show that the most popular seme partners are all 
white Caucasians: first England, followed by the USA, France, Prussia, 
Italy, and Russia (StadioYou 2010a: 1).
I suggest that the internalization of a Eurocentric history and cartogra-
phy plays a prominent role in the popularity of Hetalia not only in Japan, 
but also worldwide, especially in Euro-American contexts. Eurocentrism 
and whiteness contribute to the immediate familiarity and direct appro-
priation of the Hetalia world and characters by Euro-American readers, 
without any need for complex mediation imposed by displacing differ-
ence or otherness. This familiarity is further enhanced by the specific 
stereotyping of characters according to modern clichés of the so-called 
national characters, adopted by the author Himaruya in response to the 
ethnic jokes common among his American friends when he was studying 
in New York. For instance, Japan is shy, well mannered, loves the changes 
of seasons and technological gadgets, but is clumsy in communicating his 
feelings and thoughts. On the contrary, Italy is a light-hearted, idler, and 
pizza–pasta–music-loving coward. America is an energetic, self-confident, 
always hamburger-eating character who loves to play hero, but is supersti-
tious and afraid of supernatural beings.9
In addition to its wider Eurocentric cartography and fascination 
for whiteness, it is also important to pay attention to more position-
ally specific differences introduced by Hetalia’s recontextualization of 
Occidentalism, and to acknowledge other intersections related to more 
ambivalent spheres of identification and nuanced modes of appropria-
tion. According to the aforementioned Gentōsha survey, “nation” is the 
second most appreciated aspect among general readers.10 Nations are 
anthropomorphized as shōnen (cute boys) characters, and, in the absence 
of a supporting narrative and graphic sophistication, are condensed as 
the exclusive focus of the short episodes. This means that, on the one 
hand, Eurocentrism, whiteness, history, and geopolitical asymmetry are 
clarified and essentialized, considering the wide use of stereotypes related 
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to nation, ethnicity, and language, and that characters, at least in the 
original, are only known by nation names (“Japan,” “Italy,” “Germany,” 
etc.).11 Entire nations are personified through a unified human body, 
personality, and name, contributing to the erasure of internal diversities 
and historical complexities. For instance, Occidentalism is enhanced by 
personifying USA, Russia, or Germany as strong, blond-haired, active 
characters, while self-Orientalism is reaffirmed by Japan as a shy, passive, 
insecure, and feminized boy or kid.
At the same time, it is the very anthropomorphic and caricaturized 
incarnation of modern nationhood, as seen in the insistence upon childish 
and intimate male-to-male relations, that introduces a fundamental ironic 
slippage to conventional images of world history, international relations, 
and national politics. This contributes to exhilarating effects, and stimu-
lates a polymorphous range of symbolic associations and emotions, both 
of which have been crucial in mobilizing such widespread readings of the 
original manga and so many parodies among amateur prosumers.
 DOUBLE PARODY OF THE “WEST”
As far as the pleasure of parodying Hetalia is concerned, it is important 
to stress that the original is not a mere personification of Euro-American 
nations or of Japan, but already a parody of them: a pastiche, which may 
oscillate between an homage to Eurocentric history and fascination for 
whiteness, and a mocking caricature of their national stereotypes and their 
infantile behaviour. In this regard, Occidentalism functions in the orig-
inal as a kind of discursive hypotext. The hegemonic grand narrative, 
so familiar in both Euro-American and Japanese contexts, is transfigured 
by resorting to an effective bricolage of highly popular icons, borrowed 
strategically by both male-oriented otaku and female-oriented fujoshi 
subcultures.12
Boys Love and yaoi fantasies, on the other hand, are dominant 
in dōjinshi works, displaying in many cases a male homoerotic and 
very sexually explicit, often pornographic version of Occidentalism. 
Anthropomorphized Eurocentrism and geopolitical hierarchy may be 
 further enhanced due to the yaoi code of seme and uke, focusing on 
a far more restricted relation and narrative than in the original. This 
makes the hierarchic and dualistic dialectic of identity and otherness 
imposed upon historical relations between nations even more evident. 
As Nagaike Kazumi has highlighted in her study on the racialized tex-
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tuality of Boys Love magazines, this hierarchic dialectic emerges in the 
“masculine” superiorization of the Euro-American other as seme, the 
“feminine” inferiorization of the Japanese self as uke, and the exotic 
Orientalization or erasure of the “Rest” of the world (Nagaike 2009).
However, unlike commercial Boys Love works, these dōjinshi are 
amateur works, parodies of the original Hetalia. If Himaruya’s work 
is already itself a parody of the hegemonic hypotext of Occidentalism, 
then these dōjinshi are a parody of a parody. Due to the different posi-
tionality of the mostly female dōijinshi authors living in Japan, the dis-
cursive distance concerning Occidentalism as well as Euro-American 
material referentiality is therefore further enhanced and diluted. When 
Himaruya composed Hetalia, he was living in New York, and he was 
mostly inspired by Euro- American friends and students in modelling his 
manga characters. Dōjinshi authors, on the other hand, live in Japan, and 
their recontextualization is shaped both by different gendered positions 
and by referentiality to different people, and to different material, social, 
and institutional conditions.
According to my interviews, dōjinshi authors and readers are actu-
ally not very fond of Euro-American history and nations, whiteness, the 
original work and its author, or male homosexuality. That is, Hetalia 
authors and cosplayers are not necessarily interested in foreign countries 
or concrete persons per se. Most of them have never been to Europe 
or North America, have never met a Caucasian boy or man, and do not 
necessarily express interest in doing so. Instead, they focus on how to 
use these settings and icons according to the visual grammar and estab-
lished conventions of the Boys Love and yaoi genres in order to share 
and enjoy them with other fans. Much time may be invested in study-
ing the preferred nation character’s history, language, customs, dress, 
food, and architecture, all in the most minute detail. This includes 
bibliographic research, online or in libraries, and in some cases even 
short trips to European cities, which may become on their return the 
setting for their own dōjinshi adaptation. Interestingly, this acquired 
knowledge can also be used to legitimate what might be perceived as 
an embarrassing hobby. What matters to these fans are the specific and 
concrete needs of a teenager or young woman in relation to the gen-
dered and sexualized norms informing  external relations with other 
teenagers, men, and adults, as well as their internal relations with the 
dōjinshi or Hetalia fandom.13
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I must specify here that not all female dōjinshi fall within the genres of 
“pornographic” (for 18+ readers) and “sex” (for 15+ readers), although 
in the case of the adaptations Hetalia those are prevalent. What they all 
have in common however is the grammar of yaoi “sexualised parody.” The 
text must be a parody, which requires the existence of an original or hypo-
text in which the characters are male (in this case the original manga by 
Himaruya); and sexualized, because the adaptation is done according to 
a more or less eroticized cross-gender logic, mostly male gay, sometimes 
queer or paedophile, in many cases just hinted at, in others explicit and 
highly detailed.
 CONCLUSIONS: JAPAN AND “POST”-JAPAN
Returning to the initial question, what can Hetalia and its extraordinary 
success in the field of women’s subcultures reveal about the relationship 
between national identity, history, and young people? As with any multi-
media platform, that cannot be reduced to a single work and reception, it 
would be misguided to attempt a single unified interpretation. This is even 
more true for the media mix started by Hetalia, which, together with its 
reverberation in the amateur sphere, was able in a few years to generate a 
wide range of diverse and conflicting reactions.
On the one hand, the Japanese fandom has tried to limit its consump-
tion within the tested channels of hobbified, private intimacy, typical of 
the female dōjinshi circuit. On the other hand, its online visibility has 
inadvertently exposed the world of Hetalia to a series of reactions, includ-
ing those of the indignant male netizens of South Korea who objected to 
the stereotypical representation of the character Korea. This led in 2009 
to a petition to Parliament to stop (successfully) the announced televi-
sion broadcasting of the anime version of Hetalia, on grounds of “crimi-
nal discrimination” against the Korean people.14 Such unexpected public 
resonance, amplified by the national and international media, further con-
tributed to the spread of the manga in the international manga and anime 
fandom community, originating new accusations from within the fandom, 
especially against its superficial discussion of world history and its appro-
priation of serious history in the mode of yaoi, finally mobilizing the atten-
tion of scholars and academics.
It would be easy to conclude with a relativist view, intent on legiti-
mizing any single interpretation as attributable to specific locations, 
often irreconcilable: Japanese fangirl, anti-Japanese Asian, post-feminist 
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or post- modern academic, international fandom, and so on. There is 
no doubt however that Hetalia exemplifies a new phase of the “cyni-
cal romanticism” theorized by Kitada as the cypher of contemporary 
Japanese youth nationalism. The modern paradigms of “White West,” 
“Nation,” “History,” but also those of “love” and “(hetero) sexual cou-
ple” continue to provide essential reference points for identity formation, 
although as transfigured surrogates. They are not, however, as Kitada 
rightly suggests, only empty and formal simulacra, but representations 
and practices that require, and induce, a high level of emotional invest-
ment. In the case of Hetalia, these translate into an idea of nation and 
history that is further dispersed in the already globalized Japanese media 
mix, and, at the same time, becomes even more intense and passionate 
because of the mobilization of moe biopolitics that is able to activate the 
most intimate aspects of parodic, polymorphous, and eroticized pleasure.
In conclusion, lest we overstate the impact of Hetalia, we must remem-
ber that it is a subcultural phenomenon; both the original versions and 
the thousands of adaptations are essentially parodies of modern ideas of 
Nation and History that are still very present in the institutional arena. 
However, the parodies are characterized by an ambivalent status, a para-
doxical double bind with their hypotextual original that sees them engage 
in both repetitive confirmation and subversive critique. And this concerns 
youth subcultures all over the world in their attempt to relate to their past 
and present societies:
As the postwar finally “ends”, the task in Japan and elsewhere is therefore 
to reconceive the modern, which is less an idea than an episteme, less a con-
cept than a condition […]. We all seem to suffer from a kind of conceptual 
insufficiency, in that we are facing the twenty-first century armed with the 
notions of the nineteenth. We are still moderns, which explain our obses-
sion with “ends” and the caesura of 1989, but ours is a “nontopia”: we are 
without a vision of the future. The millennial challenge therefore is less a 
question of ends or of overcoming the modern than to avoid being over-
come by the modern and drifting visionless into the next millennium. And 
this problem is not Japan’s alone, but all of ours (Gluck 2003: 312)
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NOTES
1. For the full results of the survey, see http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/
h26-shakai/zh/z02.html. Accessed June 10, 2015.
2. For the combined results and analysis of these two surveys, see http://
www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/9465.html. Accessed June 10, 2015.
3. http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-shakai/zh/z01.html. Accessed 
June 10, 2015.
4. In addition to the generational gap of patriotism, gendered differences are 
also an important variable. According to the 2015 Ministry survey, 60.9 % of 
male respondents express “strong love for the nation,” in contrast to 50.6 % 
of female respondents.
5. http://www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/5223.html
6. Yahoo Auctions Japan online lists 8443 Japanese dōjinshi and 2565 cosplay 
items related to Hetalia http://auctions.search.yahoo.co.jp/search?p= per-
centA5 percentD8 percentA5 percentBF percentA5 percentEA percentA5 
percentA2&auccat=0&tab_ex=commerce&ei=euc-jp. Accessed June 10, 
2015.
7. Survey conducted in 2010 by Gentōsha Comics: www.gentosha-comics.
net/hetalia/enquete/index.html. Accessed June 10, 2015.
8. www.gentosha-comics.net/hetalia/enquete/index_02.html. Accessed June 
10, 2015.
9. For a detailed description of all character nations, see http://hetalia.wikia.
com/wiki/List_of_Axis_Powers_Hetalia_characters. Accessed June 10, 
2015.
10. www.gentosha-comics.net/hetalia/enquete/index.html. Accessed June 10, 
2015.
11. In contrast to the original manga and anime series, personal names sug-
gested by Himaruya himself are widely used in dōjinshi adaptations 
(Italy = Feliciano Vargas; Germany = Ludwig; Japan = Kiku Honda; 
USA = Alfred F. Jones, etc.).
12. The sexualized and male homoerotic overtones of Himaruya’s Hetalia char-
acters remain mostly implicit, allowing for appreciation by a wider reader-
ship, who are not interested or even detest yaoi-inspired homoerotic and 
sexually explicit representations.
13. Among fandom in Italy, these needs and problems are very similar, attesting 
to the globalized structure of heteronormative and patriarchal norms, as well 
as the potential of Hetalia and yaoi fantasy to cope with them and to stimu-
late liberating pleasures, expressions, and practices. What differs is the specific 
way of expressing and performing the Hetalia world. Compared to Japan, 
there is less manga parody and much more emphasis on collective cosplaying 
and fan fiction, as well as some involvement of male manga/anime 
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fans. For a public, collective, and joyous performance, see the Hetalia Cosplay 
Group at Rimini Comics 2010 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-fLtXG98T4).
14. The news can be seen online at www.youtube.com/watch?v=yo_btds9- kM. 
Accessed June 10, 2015.
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